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INTRODUCTION
[The patient was] confused, could not move his legs, had difficulty
breathing, and was in excruciating pain - screaming whenever he
moved and grimacing with each breath. He was near death .... He
was given a subcutaneous infusion of opioids ... 30 percent higher
than his usual dose, and the nurses were instructed to give him
another dose, equal to 10 percent of the total daily dose, "as needed"
every half hour if he appeared to be in pain (the proper approach,
according to standard guidelines). 1
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1. Timothy E. Quill & Diane E. Meier, The Big Chill: Inserting the DEA into End-of-Life
Care, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2006).
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This patient was in an advanced stage of lung cancer.2 Because the
attending physicians and nurses feared hastening the patient's death - a
crime in many states if done knowingly 3 - the nurses did not give him
the "as needed" dose of opioids.4 Only after consulting ethicists and
palliative care experts did the staff administer opioids to relieve the
patient's agonizing pain, and even after the consultation, some of the
nurses doubted that they had done the right thing.5
Fear of hastening death is one of several contributing factors lead-
ing physicians to administer inadequate pain relief. Abuse of painkillers
such as OxyContin has led the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") to heavily scrutinize physicians who prescribe the drugs to
patients.6 Stricter enforcement of these physicians is a result of addicts
posing as seriously ill patients who need the drug.7 Dr. Timothy Quill'
protests the DEA's actions, claiming that they will deter otherwise com-
petent, ethical physicians from prescribing such medication.9 Quill
argues that physicians' fear of stringent government regulation hinders
effective end-of-life (palliative) care to patients suffering from terminal
conditions.'" Quill says that "[m]ore than 90 percent of the pain associ-
ated with severe illness can be relieved if physicians adhere to well-
established guidelines and seek help, when necessary, from experts in
pain management or palliative care," and "there is a growing consensus
that sedation to the point of comfortable sleep is permissible.""
Case law and legislation highlight the double-edged sword that
physicians face in their treatment of terminally ill patients. On one
hand, ethical and legal considerations require that physicians treat
patients to the best of their ability or potentially face heavy fines. On
the other hand, the DEA's actions instill caution and even fear in physi-
cians who do not want to be investigated for overprescribing medication
to terminally ill patients.
This Note proposes that the DEA's stringent crackdown on the pre-
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRtm. LAW § 3-103(a) (West 2006) (permitting physicians to
"administer[ ] or prescrib[e] a procedure or... medication to relieve pain, even if the medication
or procedure may hasten death or increase the risk of death, unless the licensed health care
professional" does so knowing the prescription will hasten the patient's death).
4. Quill & Meier, supra note I, at 2.
5. Id.
6. Jane Brody, Let's Get Serious About Relieving Chronic Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006,
at F7.
7. See id.
8. Dr. Quill is a professor at the University of Rochester School of Medicine and the director
of the Center for Palliative Care and Clinical Ethics. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1.
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scription of pain medications adversely affects physicians' treatment of
terminally ill patients and violates patients' right to pain relief. Part I
provides an overview of palliative care and its role in end-of-life care.
Part II argues that patients have a right to pain relief, supported by a
survey of state legislation and Supreme Court cases. Part III outlines the
regulations governing physicians' prescription practices at the federal
and state level. Part IV details some of the consequences arising from
such regulation from the perspective of physicians as well as pain
patients. Part V highlights the decision rendered in Gonzales v. Ore-
gon12 and discusses the impact, or lack thereof, of this highly anticipated
decision on the medical and legal landscape. Finally, Part VI proposes
solutions - both tangible and conceptual - to remedy the increasing ten-
sion between relieving pain and regulatory oversight.
I. UNDERSTANDING PALLIATIVE CARE
A. Defining Palliative Care
"Palliative" is defined as "[r]educing the severity of; denoting the
alleviation of symptoms without curing the underlying disease."' 3 The
National Cancer Institute ("NCI"), a subset of the Department of Health
and Human Services ("DHHS"), defines palliative care as "[c]are given
to improve the quality of life of patients who have a serious or life-
threatening disease."' 4 In its definition, the NCI states that "[t]he goal
of palliative care is to prevent or treat as early as possible the symptoms
of the disease, side effects caused by treatment of the disease, and psy-
chological, social, and spiritual problems related to the disease or its
treatment," and palliative care is sometimes referred to as "comfort care,
"supportive care, [or] symptom management."' 5 Similar to the NCI's
stated goal, New York legislation states that the goal of palliative care is
to "achieve[ ] . . . the best quality of life for patients and families. '"6
Also writing about the importance of palliative care, physicians in a
1999 article focused on how to constructively converse with terminally
ill patients about the end of their lives.' 7 Like the NCI, this article states
that the goal of palliative care is to "focus[ ] on relief of suffering,
psychosocial support, and, as much as possible, closure near the end of
12. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
13. STEDMAN'S ONLINE MEDICAL DICTIONARY, http://www.stedmans.com/ (type "palliative"
in search box; then click "GO"; then click "palliative") (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
14. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, NCI DICTIONARY OF CANCER TERMS, http://www.cancer.
gov/Templates/db-alpha.aspx?print=l&cdrid=269448 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
15. Id.
16. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 4012-b(2)(b) (McKinney 2006).
17. Bernard Lo et al., Discussing Palliative Care with Patients, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
744 (1999).
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life.""8 Another author defined palliative care as "the study and man-
agement of patients with active, progressive, far advanced disease, for
whom the prognosis is limited and the focus of care is the quality of
life." 9 Alaska's statute defines palliative care as "medical care or treat-
ment rendered to reduce or moderate temporarily the intensity of pain
caused by an otherwise stable medical condition, but does not include
those medical services rendered to diagnose, heal, or permanently allevi-
ate or eliminate a medical condition."
20
Other state definitions will be discussed below. These definitions
highlight the importance of distinguishing palliative care from life sup-
port methods (i.e., a feeding tube) in that palliative care does not aim to
prolong a patient's life. Rather, it is a method of alleviating physical
pain as well as psychological and spiritual strife. Indeed, such a distinc-
tion serves as the backdrop in the "clash of absolutes" between curative
care and palliative care.2 ' The problem with emphasizing curative care,
according to one author, is that it is "hostile to effective care of chronic
pain patients, [and] to patients with terminal illness as well."22 As for
which "side" of the debate is currently winning, research paints a con-
vincing picture that the curative approach to treatment is prevailing.23
B. Physical Pain Relief
"Common misconceptions are that opioids are dangerous, cause
addiction, shorten life, or are used only as a last resort. In fact, they are
relatively safe, rarely if ever cause addiction or respiratory depression in
the terminally ill, and are a mainstay of therapy ... for pain."24
OxyContin is an opioid narcotic containing oxycodone, a pain
reliever similar to morphine, which is released slowly over time. 25 Most
states have enacted statutes deeming opioids such as OxyContin to have
"legitimate, therapeutic uses for the treatment of chronic pain." 26 The
Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") Web site contains this and
18. Id.
19. N. MacDonald, Palliative Care: The Fourth Phase of Cancer Prevention, 253 CANCER
DETECTION & PREVENTION 5 (1991).
20. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(28) (2006).
21. Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain
Management, 26 WM. MrCHELL L. REV. 1, 21 (2000).
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 22-25.
24. Lo et al., supra note 17, at 748.
25. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, OxyContin: Questions
and Answers, Aug. 2, 2001, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/oxycontin/oxycontin-qa.htm#
whatkind.
26. Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain: What
Can Medical Boards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 332 (1998).
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other factual information about opioids, but the bulk of the information
about OxyContin is cautionary. 7 The frequency of OxyContin fatalities
and reported addictions discourages physicians from prescribing the nar-
cotic, but some argue that this should not prevent use by patients who
are suffering a considerable amount of pain.28
C. Social, Psychological, and Spiritual Comfort
The focus of this Note is on physical pain relief and the DEA's
interference with such relief; however, palliative care also requires a
therapeutic approach to each patient's social, psychological, and spiri-
tual well-being. To administer effective palliative care beyond physical
pain relief, a physician must possess the communication skills necessary
to discuss end-of-life care and respond to difficult questions from the
patient or the patient's family. 29 Although essential, communication is
sometimes not sufficient in providing the patient with end-of-life com-
fort, especially if the patient is religious. Effective palliative care thus
often involves seeking outside help from a rabbi or priest to address the
patient's spiritual concerns.3" Caring for a patient who is close to death
requires the physician to be acutely aware of the patients' concerns both
physically and emotionally; this extremely personal level of care and
communication is what makes palliative care unique from curative
treatment.
II. PATIENTS HAVE A RIGHT TO PALLIATIVE CARE
A. Constitutional Right
The Supreme Court's opinions in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,3 Washington v. Glucksberg,32 and Vacco v.
Quill33 have come close to recognizing that access to pain relief may be
a fundamental right.34 This right to palliative care, however, should fol-
low from the logical relationship between liberty, privacy, and
autonomy.35
The Cruzan opinion assumes that there is a liberty interest in refus-
27. See, e.g., id. at 332, 336.
28. See generally Brody, supra note 6; Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 1.
29. See Lo et al., supra note 17, at 746.
30. Id. at 746-47.
31. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
32. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
33. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
34. See Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to
Pain Relief, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 495, 525 (2003).
35. See id. at 524 (citation omitted).
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ing medical treatment.36 Cruzan is a seminal case in the right to die
debate, not only because of its holding, but also for the issues left open
after the case. The plaintiffs' daughter, Nancy Cruzan, suffered severe
injuries in a 1983 car accident, rendering her incompetent and in a per-
sistent vegetative state, yet not terminally ill.37 Cruzan's parents wished
to remove their daughter's life-sustaining feeding tube, and when the
hospital refused to do so, the Cruzans received injunctive relief from the
trial court to terminate the nutrition.38 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "clear and convincing, inherently reliable
evidence" with respect to Cruzan's wishes was not presented in the
case.39  The broad issue for the U.S. Supreme Court was "whether
Cruzan ha[d] a right under the United States Constitution which would
require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under
these circumstances."4 ° The Court later framed the issue as "whether
the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance
referred to as a 'right to die.' "41
The narrow holding is not what makes Cruzan so important in
establishing a right to palliative care.4 2 Rather, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion relies largely on the preservation of life and the "mainte-
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.' ' 4  The opinion
asserts that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" based on prior
Supreme Court decisions. 44 By emphasizing the liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted treatment, the opinion implicitly acknowledges the neces-
sity of pain relief. It would be inconsistent for the Court to acknowledge
a liberty interest in refusing pain relief but deny an interest in providing
or accepting pain relief, as long as it is done so in accordance with legal,
medical, and ethical principles.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, four physicians, three terminally ill
patients, and the non-profit organization Compassion in Dying chal-
lenged a Washington statute criminalizing physician-assisted suicide.4 5
36. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions.").
37. Id. at 266 & n.l.
38. Id. at 267-68.
39. Id. at 268-69.
40. Id. at 269.
41. Id. at 277.
42. The Court ultimately held that it was constitutionally permissible for Missouri to adopt a
clear and convincing evidence standard with respect to an incompetent's wishes regarding the
removal of life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 280-81.
43. Id. at 271.
44. Id. at 278.
45. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1997).
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The plaintiffs argued that the statute violated a "mentally competent,
terminally ill" adult's liberty interest in committing suicide.4 6 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for a five-member majority, rejected this argu-
ment and "conclude[d] that the asserted 'right' to assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest."47 Rehnquist
distinguished Cruzan by emphasizing the distinction between the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the right to commit suicide;
the former, but not the latter, has historically enjoyed common law pro-
tection.48 One commentator views this distinction as an implied grant of
a right to palliative care: "By authoritatively pronouncing that terminal
sedation intended for symptomatic relief is not assisted suicide, the
Court has licensed an aggressive practice of palliative care."4 9 Dr. Quill
agrees with the notion that the Glucksberg opinion contains implicit
approval of aggressive palliative care, writing that "[t]he justices were
concerned about the current inadequacies of access to and delivery of
palliative care."50
As a companion case to Glucksberg, Vacco v. Quill similarly
upheld the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing assisted suicide.5"
Physicians and terminally ill patients challenged New York's criminal-
ization of assisted suicide under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.52 The plaintiffs claimed that the prohibition ran
counter to New York's legislation and case law permitting a competent
person to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.53 At trial, the district
court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, citing the "difference between
allowing nature to take its course ... and intentionally using an artificial
death-producing device."54  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's decision, finding a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause based on the fact that New York did not treat equally all
"competent persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish
to hasten their deaths. 55 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision. 6
46. Id. at 708 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
47. Id. at 728.
48. Id. at 725.
49. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997) (citation omitted).
50. Timothy E. Quill, Retrospective: Dying and Decision Making: Evolution of End-of-Life
Options, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2030 (2004).
51. 521 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1997).
52. Id. at 797-98.
53. Id. at 798.
54. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
55. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1996).
56. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. at 809.
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished palliative
care from physician-assisted suicide by saying: "[W]hen a doctor pro-
vides aggressive palliative care[,] . . . painkilling drugs may hasten a
patient's death, but the physician's purpose and intent is ... only to ease
his patient's pain. A doctor who assists a suicide, however, must, neces-
sarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead."57
In a footnote at the end of the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "a
State ... may permit palliative care related to that refusal [of unwanted
medical treatment], which may have the foreseen but unintended 'double
effect' of hastening the patient's death."58 This assertion is significant
because it gives the states permission to grant a right to palliative care,
even if such aggressive pain relief will hasten a patient's death. When
the two aforementioned statements are read together, there is a strong
inference that aggressive palliative care has been approved by the Court.
Throughout the opinion, the Court distinguished assisting suicide from
administering palliative care and acknowledged the overwhelming trend,
even as of 1997 when the opinion was written, "to protect and promote
patients' dignity at the end of life."5 9
Although there was no majority on all of the issues in Glucksberg
and Quill, Beth Packman Weinman analyzed the concurring opinions
and concluded that at least four Justices of the Rehnquist Court asserted
a fundamental right to pain relief.6" Similarly, a 1997 editorial focused
on these concurrences and concluded that a majority in both opinions
"provided an unexpected but strong and very welcome directive requir-
ing states to remove the barriers that their laws and policies impose on
the availability of palliative care."'" The Court did not explicitly assert a
fundamental right to palliative care in these seminal opinions, but it also
was not presented squarely with the issue.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence highlights the importance of
achieving a "balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally
competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the
State's interests in protecting those who might seek to end life mistak-
enly or under pressure."62 Justice O'Connor points out the significance
of the availability of palliative care to terminally ill patients in Washing-
ton and New York at the time the decision was rendered.63 Justice
57. Id. at 802 (quotations and citation omitted).
58. Id. at 808 n.1 1 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 804-06 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
60. Weinman, supra note 34, at 526-29.
61. Burt, supra note 49, at 1237.
62. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 736-37 ("[I]n these States a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who
is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians,
[Vol. 61:961
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Breyer's concurrence in Glucksberg and Quill64 concludes with a force-
ful implication that the Court may recognize a right to palliative care:
"[W]ere state law to prevent the provision of palliative care, including
the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the end of life[,]
then the law's impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical
pain (accompanying death) would be more directly at issue. '"65
Although the immediate intent behind this concluding statement was to
give an example of a "gap" in the law that might justify assisted suicide
after Quill and Glucksberg, it assumes the need for further exploration
by the Supreme Court as to whether patients have a right to receive pain
relief. Justice Breyer also notes that the New York and Washington
laws at the time of these two cases "[did] not prohibit doctors from pro-
viding patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite the risk that
those drugs themselves will kill."'66 Justice Stevens' concurrence is even
more explicit in asserting a patient's need and right to palliative care.
He agrees with the states on one level, that "[e]ncouraging the develop-
ment and ensuring the availability of adequate pain treatment is of
utmost importance," although he refuses to conclude that availability of
palliative care should render assisted suicide illegal.67 However, using
the holdings of Quill and Glucksberg as a premise, along with Justice
Stevens' statement, a statewide ban on assisted suicide seems to necessi-
tate a regime of aggressive palliative care. In other words, if a state has
a "legitimate interest[ ] in preventing suicide, 68 then it should follow
that citizens of that state have a right to receive the best pain manage-
ment possible if they are in such a condition. Justice Stevens also makes
reference to a liberty interest in dying with dignity.69
B. Statutory Right
States are increasingly enacting regulations dealing with palliative
care, pain management, or pain relief.70 There is also a growing trend in
to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death."); id.
at 737-38 ("There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain
palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths.").
64. The concurrences of Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens apply to
both Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill.
65. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 810
(Breyer, J., concurring).
66. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring); Vacco, 521 U.S. at 810 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
67. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 747, 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 747.
69. See, e.g., id. at 743 ("This freedom embraces not merely a person's right to refuse a
particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in determining the
character of the memories that will survive long after her death.").
70. Timothy Mclntire, Elder Abuse Litigation and the Duty to Provide Palliative Care,
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states establishing a "Patient's Bill of Rights." To discern whether there
is an express or implied right to palliative care contained in these regula-
tions, it is important to first understand the context in which each state
regulates "palliative care" and the treatment of "intractable pain." This
Part contains a survey of state laws and concludes that, based on the
widespread recognition of a need for adequate pain treatment, and in
some cases an explicit "right" to receive adequate pain treatment, there
is a fundamental right to palliative care.
Alaska defines palliative care in its "Labor and Workers' Compen-
sation" statute, but it does not go further into detail about that to which
the general public is entitled with respect to such pain management. 7' In
California's Health and Safety Code, a hospice, in its role as a "Special
Hospital, ' 72 "shall be deemed to provide acute palliative care."73 Most
states that incorporate the phrase "palliative care" into their statutory
regime use the phrase in a similar manner to California's hospice stat-
utes74 or Alaska's workers' compensation regulations.7 States with
extensive living wills or advance healthcare directive legislation have
PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 45 ("For the protection of physicians and clients alike,
many states adopted specific palliative care and intractable pain management statutes or
regulations. While the need to limit patient narcotic abuse is still present, many states realize this
need must be balanced with guidelines for the treatment of the elderly and the terminally ill
suffering from intractable pain. As such, many states emphasize concerns involving narcotics in
both the addiction aspect and the treatment of pain in the elderly and the terminally ill."); see also
AMERICAN PAIN SOCIETY, THE USE OF OPIOiDS FOR THE TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN (1996),
available at http://www.ampainsoc.org/advocacy/opioids.htm ("State law and policy about opioid
use are currently undergoing revision. The trend is to adopt laws or guidelines that specifically
recognize the use of opioids to treat intractable pain. These statements serve as indicators of
increased public awareness of the sequelae of undertreated pain and help clarify that the use of
opioids for the relief of chronic pain is a legitimate medical practice.").
71. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(28) (2006).
72. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.31(a) (Deering 2006) (using the phrase "palliative
care" in its definition of a hospice and providing seven mandatory criteria of what amounts to
palliative care); § 1339.31(e) (defining the term "special hospital: hospice").
73. § 1339.32.
74. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 25-1.5-103(2)(d) (West 2006); § 400.601(4), FLA. STAT. (2006);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-7-171(b), -172(5) (2006); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/3(d) (West 2005); IND.
CODE §§ 12-15-40-5(1), 16-25-1.1-6(1) (West 2006); IowA CODE § 135J.3(4) (2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:2182(4), (6) (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8621(9) (2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21534 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144A.753(2)(3) (West 2006);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-85-3(d) (West 2006); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-418 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15 1-C:2(XIX-b) (2006); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4012-b(2)(b) (McKinney 2006); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 131E-201(8) (West 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-17.4-01(8) (2006); OHIo REV.
CODE. ANN. § 3712.01(E) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-860.2(8) (2006); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 142.001(15) (Vernon 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.1 (West 2006);
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.38.230(2) (West 2006); Wis. STAT. § 50.90(3) (West 2006).
75. See § 440.13(n), FLA. STAT. (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(22) (2006); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97.25-4 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 656.005(20) (West 2006); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-33-10(c) (2006).
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incorporated palliative care into such a regime.76 A few states have set
out a clear legislative intent to provide pediatric patients with better pal-
liative care." Until July 2006, Florida encouraged physicians to con-
tinue their education in palliative care by allowing a physician to do so
in lieu of continuing education in HIV.78 States like Florida, Virginia,
and Maine require the appropriate agency to pay for palliative care
under their respective healthcare regulations.7 9 Maryland explicitly pro-
vides an exception for "palliative care" and pain relief from its criminal-
ization of assisted suicide, "even if the medication or procedure may
hasten death or increase the risk of death," unless the physician does so
with the intent to hasten death.80 New York's controlled substances pro-
vision explicitly highlights that palliative care is a "legitimate use of
controlled substances."'" North Carolina even gives the Secretary of
Correction discretion to authorize a prisoner to leave the confines of the
institution to receive palliative care if terminally ill or permanently
disabled.82
Many states have specific commissions devoted to increasing
understanding and awareness of palliative care. Missouri has a State
Advisory Council on Pain and Symptom Management and requires the
Council to include "[o]ne physician. . . that is certified and accredited in
palliative care."83 Similarly, New Hampshire's Department of Health
and Human Services Oversight Committee is required to study "[h]ow to
increase understanding and access to palliative care services in all areas
of the state."84 As part of its Health Care Facilities Planning Act, New
Jersey requires its Commissioner of Health and Senior Services to con-
sult with, among other groups, the New Jersey Hospice and Palliative
Care Organization." New Jersey also requires its State Commission on
Cancer Research to "encourage the development within the State of
research projects on ... pain management and palliative care for persons
76. See §§ 765.102, 110, 1103, FLA. STAT. (2006); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-9-102 (West
2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-2 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103 (West 2006).
77. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2175.12(B)(3) (2006) (incorporating "palliative care" in
the definition of a "children's respite care center"); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 42-12.3-8(b) (2006)
("[Tihe department of human services shall also provide pediatric palliative care services to
eligible children under the age of nineteen (19) years who have a terminal illness ... .
78. See § 458.319(4), FLA. STAT. (2006) (repealed 2006).
79. § 409.905(6), FLA. STAT. (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3174-FF(3)(E)(3) (2006)
(MaineCare Basic); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.11 (2006) (Virginia Coverage for hospice care).
80. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-103(a) (West 2006).
81. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3300-a(2) (McKinney 2006).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-4(8) (West 2006).
83, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.350(6) (West 2006).
84. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-A:15(I-a)(b) (West 2006).
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-5c (West 2006).
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diagnosed with cancer. '8 6 New York's State Board for Professional
Medical Conduct requires at least one of its (minimum) eighteen physi-
cians to "have expertise in palliative care."87 Such widespread recogni-
tion of the increasing importance of palliative care demonstrates that
states intend for their citizens to receive end-of-life pain relief.
With the same general goal of relieving pain, at least twenty-three
states have statutes regulating the treatment of chronic, intractable
pain.88 A common thread in Intractable Pain Treatment Acts ("IPTA")
is the emphasis on accessibility of pain treatment to patients,89 as well as
the regular incorporation of pain treatment in a physician's medical
practice for patients who suffer chronic intractable pain.9° These stat-
utes were created with the aim of "provid[ing] physicians with some
measure of regulatory relief by reducing the real and perceived risks of
being subjected to regulatory sanctions for treating pain with opioids."9t
Some might argue that incorporating a phrase or concept into legis-
lation is merely a sign that the state's legislators acknowledge the exis-
tence of palliative care or pain management, not that the legislators are
creating some fundamental right. However, some states, like Florida,
plainly express that its citizens should have such a right:
The Legislature recognizes the need for all health care professionals
to rapidly increase their understanding of end-of-life and palliative
care. Therefore, the Legislature encourages the professional regula-
tory boards to adopt appropriate standards and guidelines regarding
end-of-life care and pain management and encourages educational
institutions established to train health care professionals and allied
health professionals to implement curricula to train such profession-
als to provide end-of-life care, including pain management and pallia-
tive care.92
The section explains palliative care in greater detail, enumerating eleven
requirements to which a physician must adhere when administering pal-
liative care, the first being a discussion with the patient regarding end-
86. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9U-5(d)(2) (West 2006).
87. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 230(1) (McKinney 2006).
88. Sandra H. Johnson, The Social, Professional, and Legal Framework for the Problem of
Pain Management in Emergency Medicine, 33 J.L. MED. & ETmics 741, 754 (2005) ("At least 23
state legislatures have enacted 'intractable pain statutes' to further affirm the importance of
treating pain, and to set out some guidance for appropriate regulatory oversight of prescribing
practices."); see, e.g., Chronic Intractable Pain Treatment Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-701
(West 2006); Intractable Pain Treatment Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5 (West 2007);
Pain Patient's Bill of Rights, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE pt. 4.5, § 124960 (West 2006).
89. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-702(2) (West 2006); § 124960(h); see also Martino,
supra note 26, at 332.
90. See § 17-95-702(3).
91. Martino, supra note 26, at 332.
92. § 765.102(4), FLA. STAT. (2006) (emphasis supplied).
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of-life care, and the other ten being assurances of the level and quality of
care the patient will receive. 93
Tennessee expresses a similar sentiment in its Living Wills statute,
in that its legislative intent was to ensure "that every person has the
fundamental and inherent right ... to accept, refuse, withdraw from, or
otherwise control decisions relating to the rendering of . . .palliative
care."94 On its face, a typical Living Wills or Rights for the Terminally
Ill statute focuses on advanced directives in case the patient is eventually
no longer competent. However, an analysis of the language of such reg-
ulations reveals a state interest in assuring that a patient will be treated
adequately, unless the patient thinks otherwise. California legislation
explicitly allows doctors to administer controlled substances to patients
who are in pain.95 California also makes clear that a physician who
administers such a substance will not be subject to disciplinary action.96
Many states have enacted Patient's Bills of Rights, which set out
the level of care to which a patient is entitled.97 Florida's Patient's Bill
of Rights and Responsibilities grants patients the following rights: indi-
vidual dignity; information; financial information and disclosure; access
to healthcare; experimental research; and patient's knowledge of these
93. § 765.102(5)(b)(l)-(l1). This section reads in full:
1. An opportunity to discuss and plan for end-of-life care.
2. Assurance that physical and mental suffering will be carefully attended to.
3. Assurance that preferences for withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining
interventions will be honored.
4. Assurance that the personal goals of the dying person will be addressed.
5. Assurance that the dignity of the dying person will be a priority.
6. Assurance that health care providers will not abandon the dying person.
7. Assurance that the burden to family and others will be addressed.
8. Assurance that advance directives for care will be respected regardless of the
location of care.
9. Assurance that organizational mechanisms are in place to evaluate the
availability and quality of end-of-life, palliative, and hospice care services,
including the evaluation of administrative and regulatory barriers.
10. Assurance that necessary health care services will be provided and that relevant
reimbursement policies are available.
11. Assurance that the goals expressed in subparagraphs 1.-10. will be
accomplished in a culturally appropriate manner.
§ 765.102(5)(b)(l)-( 11).
94. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 32-11-102(a) (2006) (emphasis supplied).
95. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5 (West 2007).
96. § 2241.5(b).
97. See, e.g., Pain Patient's Bill of Rights, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124960 (West
2006); Florida Patient's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, § 381.026, FLA. STAT. (2006); Pain
Patient's Bill of Rights, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327H-2 (West 2006); Hospital Patient's Bill of
Rights, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-342 (West 2006); Health Care Bill of Rights, MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 144.651 (West 2006); Pain Patient's Bill of Rights, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-1104
(2006).
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rights and responsibilities.98 Significantly, within the patient's right of
"access to health care," Florida provides that "[a] patient has the right to
access any mode of treatment that is, in his or her own judgment and the
judgment of his or her health care practitioner, in the best interests of the
patient."'99 This right is not conditioned on physician hesitation; it defin-
itively says that a patient deserves treatment that is in his or her "best
interests," according to both the patient and the physician. Tennessee's
Pain Patient's Bill of Rights gives a patient in "severe chronic intracta-
ble pain" the right to "request . . the use of any or all modalities in
order to relieve" such pain. 100 The statute expressly allows physicians to
prescribe opiate medication for the relief of chronic, intractable pain. 01
While it does allow a physician to refuse to prescribe such medication, it
requires that, as an alternative, the physician "shall inform the patient
that there are physicians who specialize in the treatment of severe
chronic intractable pain with methods that include the use of opiates."' 2
California's Pain Patient's Bill of Rights is almost identical to Tennes-
see's. 103 Hawaii's Pain Patient's Bill of Rights is similar in content to
Tennessee's and California's, though a bit narrower in its protection of
patient rights because it gives a physician discretion to tell the patient
that there are other physicians who specialize in treatment of pain
through the use of opiates." Nearly every state provides some form of
a "right" for a patient to receive palliative care or pain management.
However, because these rights are often implicit, Congress should evalu-
ate the status of pain patients and end-of-life treatment in the United
States.
C. Medicine and Ethics: A Duty to Relieve Suffering
The Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the
Treatment of Pain ("Model Guidelines") aim to apply uniform standards
across the medical boards of each state.105 In its Preamble, the Model
Guidelines "recognize[ ] that principles of quality medical practice dic-
tate that the people of the State ... have access to appropriate and effec-
tive pain relief." ' 6 This language is mandatory, assuming that the
98. § 381.026(4).




103. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124961 (West 2006).
104. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 327H-2(3) (West 2006).
105. MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
PAIN (Fed'n of State Med. Bds. of the United States, Inc. 1998), available at http://www.medsch.
wisc.edu/painpolicy/domestic/model.htm.
106. Id. § 1.
[Vol. 61:961
2007] INFRINGEMENT ON PATIENTS' RIGHT TO PALLIATIVE CARE 975
physicians who abide by these guidelines aim at achieving "quality med-
ical practice." It ensures that the pain patients in that state will be given
proper pain relief, thus implying a right to pain relief and palliative care.
Additionally, many sources presume that physicians have a duty to
relieve suffering.' 7 A common logical correlation is that between duty
and right: where there is a right, there is a duty, and vice versa."0 8 One
author explores the sources of a physician's duty to relieve pain and
suffering, ranging from the Hippocratic Oath to philosophical assertions
of a patient's "right to freedom from unnecessary pain."' 0 9 Similarly,
the American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics enumerates
an "obligation" of the physician to "provid[e] effective palliative treat-
ment."' ' One author asserts that "[e]ven when cure is impossible, the
physician's duty of care includes palliation."'I
In sum, the Vacco and Glucksberg opinions leave open the question
of whether there is a constitutional right to palliative care. Because of
this "hole" and because the majority of states have a statutory scheme
recognizing a patient's right to adequate pain treatment and palliative
care, the time is ripe for either the Supreme Court or Congress to
expressly deem that all patients, especially those suffering from intracta-
ble pain or terminal illness, have the right to palliative care.
III. REGULATING PRESCRIPTIONS
A. State Regulation
Each state has a state bureau of narcotics and medical licensure
board' 12 which, along with the federal DEA, regulates physicians' prac-
tice of prescribing controlled substances such as OxyContin and other
Schedule II opioids. The importance of state medical boards in the regu-
lation of physicians' conduct is at least equal to that of the DEA. The
difficulty in regulating physician distribution of controlled substances is
that two distinct, important public interests intersect and conflict: the
107. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 88, at 742 ("The ethical duty to relieve pain is well
established .... [T]he core ethical obligation to relieve pain is well established in medicine
."); Rich, supra note 21, at 31.
108. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36, 39 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919).
109. Rich, supra note 21, at 32-33 (quoting Rem B. Edwards, Pain and the Ethics of Pain
Management, 18 Soc. SCIENCE & MED. 515, 517 (1984)). Other authors assume that physicians
have an "obligation ... to relieve human suffering" that "stretches back into antiquity." Eric J.
Cassel, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 639, 639
(1982).
110. CODE OF MED. ETHICS 40 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1996).
111. Linda Farber Post et al., Pain: Ethics, Culture, and Informed Consent to Relief, 24 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 348, 348 (1996).
112. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-18 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-101 (2006).
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prevention of addiction and abuse and the aggressive treatment of pain,
especially for the terminally ill. In a description of this balancing act,
one author gives credit to state medical boards' initiatives to regulate
drug abuse and overprescription without sacrificing the state's interest in
providing effective treatment for pain patients." 13 In 2004, the Federa-
tion of State Medical Boards revised their 1998 guidelines and enumer-
ated three clear goals: "fostering effective pain relief"; judging a
physician "not . . . by volume or chronicity alone, but rather by out-
comes for the patients"; and obliging the physician to "perform and doc-
ument a physician examination of the patient and a care plan that
includes appropriate follow up."1 14 As mentioned in Part II, most states
have enacted "intractable pain statutes," pain relief statutes, or regula-
tions dealing with the proper administration of palliative care to termi-
nally ill patients." 5
State acknowledgment of the importance of pain treatment hardly
precludes the state from disciplining physicians and deterring them from
overprescribing controlled substances. One example of stringent state
regulation is Multiple Copy Prescription Programs ("MCPP"), which
require physicians to "complete multipart government prescription
forms and forward copies of the forms to a designated government
agency that monitors prescriptions written and filled."' 6 California is
one of few states that require physicians to fill out prescriptions in tripli-
cate. " 7 States also limit the amount that a physician may prescribe and
dispense to the patient, as well as the length of time a patient has before
the valid prescription expires. 1 8
B. Federal Regulation
Unlike the progressive actions of state medical boards, the DEA
has tipped the "balance" in the opposite direction, increasing its restric-
tions and efforts to curb the prescription of controlled substances." 9
Regulation of prescription drugs at the federal level is overseen by the
DEA and the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").120 On October 30,
2003, the DEA issued a news release that sought to dispel the growing
sentiment that the agency's regulation of physicians' prescribing prac-
113. Johnson, supra note 88, at 754.
114. Id.
115. See supra Part II.
116. Weinman, supra note 34, at 511 n.94.
117. See id. at 532 & n.225.
118. Id. at 536-37.
119. See Johnson, supra note 88, at 754.
120. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-904 (West 2006).
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tices had a "chilling effect."' 12 1 The news release stated that during the
2003 fiscal year, the DEA sanctioned less than one tenth of one percent
(<0.1%) of registered physicians. 122 However, this news release was
issued against the backdrop of several documents that painted the DEA
as an agency seeking to strike a balance between pain relief and drug
abuse. The first statement, issued by the DEA along with twenty-one
health organizations in 2001, explicitly approved "aggressive[ ]" pain
management into end-of-life medical care as well as the use of opioids
to effectively treat pain. 123 Two years after the release of this statement,
a Principal Working Group consisting of a group of experts responsible
for issuing the first statement produced a list of Frequently Asked Ques-
tions ("FAQ").' 24 The FAQ was compiled by medical experts and was
supported by the DEA, among other organizations. 125 The FAQ was
deemed to "represent[ ] a consensus, supported by the available litera-
ture and by the laws and regulations that govern the use of controlled
prescription drugs." 126
The DEA's apparent eagerness to work with the medical commu-
nity to strike a balance between administering aggressive pain manage-
ment and curtailing drug abuse and addiction came to a halt in 2004.
The DEA issued an Interim Policy Statement, which explicitly revoked
the FAQ they had supported just a few months earlier, claiming errone-
ous data and information.1 27 The Interim Policy Statement conceded
that the subject of prescribing pain medication is "extremely important
to the public health and welfare" and that "the overwhelming majority of
physicians dispense controlled substances lawfully for legitimate medi-
cal reasons, including the treatment of pain." 128 Regardless of these
concessions, the document focused more on regulation than on educa-
tion, clarification, or awareness. The Interim Policy Statement listed
121. Press Release, Drug Enforcement Admin., The Myth of the "Chilling Effect": Doctors
Operating Within Bounds of Accepted Medical Practice Have Nothing to Fear from DEA (Oct.
30, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr103003.html.
122. Id.
123. Press Release, A Joint Statement from 21 Health Organizations and the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing Abuse of Pain Medications:
A Critical Balancing Act (Oct. 2001), http://www.unr.edu/ncehp/downloads/Consensus.pdf
(advocating a balanced regulation policy).
124. PATRICIA M. GOOD ET AL., PRESCRIPTION PAIN MEDICATIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
PERSONNEL 1-3 (2004), available at http:/www.aapsonline.org/painman/deafaq.pdf.
125. Id. at 1-2.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,170
(Drug Enforcement Admin. Nov. 16, 2004) (notice).
128. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
four "misstatements" contained in the FAQ. 2 9 Acknowledging that the
FAQ was not an official statement of the DEA, in part because it was
not published in the Federal Register, 3 ° the end of the Interim Policy
Statement addressed physician concerns in a parenthetical, citing the
"significant questions DEA has received following the withdrawal of
[the FAQ].' 13' The Statement promised that the DEA would issue an
official document in the Federal Register, aimed at "providing guidance
and reassurance to physicians who engage in legitimate pain
treatment." 
32
Two months later, the DEA set out to fulfill its promise, setting the
bureaucratic wheels in motion with a round of notice and comment
rulemaking. 33 In the notice, the DEA solicited comments from "physi-
cians and other interested members of the public as to what areas of the
law relating to the dispensing of controlled substances for the treatment
of pain they would like DEA to address in the upcoming Federal Regis-
ter document."' 3 4 The notice explained that the limited purposes of the
document were to "stay within the scope of DEA's authority by address-
ing ... the [CSA], and the DEA regulations promulgated thereunder, as
well as the pertinent court decisions. '
Eight months after issuing the notice, the DEA issued a "Clarifica-
tion" at the request of "most" of the comments they received.' 36 The
DEA reiterated its Interim Policy Statement, which stated that a physi-
cian cannot write multiple prescriptions to the same patient for a Sched-
ule II substance with "instructions to fill on different dates" because it is
"tantamount to writing a prescription authorizing refills of a [S]chedule
II controlled substance," contrary to the CSA rules.'3 7 Apparently phy-
sicians were not the only concerned commentators; the Clarification also
addressed patients who were understandably confused by the application
of the aforementioned refill rule to their various situations, which might
129. Id. at 67,171-72.
130. Id. at 67,172.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 67,170-71.
133. See Solicitation of Comments on Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment
of Pain, 70 Fed. Reg. 2,883 (Drug Enforcement Admin. Jan. 18, 2005) (notice).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Clarification of Existing Requirements Under the Controlled Substances Act for
Prescribing Schedule II Controlled Substances, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,408 (Drug Enforcement Admin.
Aug. 26, 2005) (notice) ("Most of the comments that the agency received sought clarification on
the legal requirements governing the prescribing of [S]chedule II controlled substances by
physicians in view of [the Interim Policy Statement].").
137. Id. (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,170-71 (Drug Enforcement Admin. Nov. 16, 2004) (notice)).
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involve only seeing their physician once every three months. 38 The
Clarification acknowledged in its penultimate paragraph that physicians
must adhere to state limitations on Schedule II prescriptions, such as the
amount that can be prescribed, in addition to the cSA. 139
By addressing physician, patient, and federalism concerns sepa-
rately, the Clarification did little to actually clarify what actions a patient
should take if, for instance, he or she was living in a state that limits
Schedule II prescriptions to one prescription, which may only last one
month, but, contradictorily, only allows him or her to see his or her
physician once every several months. Adding to the confusion is the
lack of uniformity among states in limiting the amount that can be pre-
scribed, which can range from a "30-day supply" to "100 dosage
units."'t4 Whereas the 2001 joint statement and the FAQ embraced
informing and working with physicians in an admittedly murky area of
the law,' 4 ' the three subsequent statements did away with this notion and
confined the DEA's goals to regulation and enforcement.
Dr. Quill describes the disparate treatment of physicians by the
DEA and state agencies: "For better or for worse, the DEA sets the tone
and drives physicians' perceptions about the legal risk associated with
prescribing Schedule [II] drugs . . . for seriously ill and dying
patients."' 4 2 The federal government has made two attempts in the past
decade to usurp state regulation. 43 The Pain Relief Promotion Act
("PRPA") would have amended the CSA by adding a provision directing
the Attorney General to "give no force and effect to State law authoriz-
ing or permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia."' 4 4 The bill had its ben-
efits, such as "Title II: Promoting Palliative Care," which would have
created a program to "[d]evelop and advance scientific understanding of
palliative care,"' 4 5 as well as a program to educate students and hospices
and train healthcare professionals in palliative care.' 4 6 However, had it
been passed, PRPA, which was originally dubbed the Lethal Drug
Abuse Prevention Act, would have effectively criminalized physician-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 50,409.
140. Weinman, supra note 34, at 537 (citation omitted).
141. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,170
(Drug Enforcement Admin. Nov. 16, 2004) (notice); Press Release, A Joint Statement from 21
Health Organizations and the Drug Enforcement Administration, supra note 123.
142. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 2-3.
143. Id. at 3; see Pain Relief Promotion Act, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101(i)(2) (1999);
Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Dep't of Justice Nov.
9, 2001) (interpretive rule) (the so-called "Ashcroft Directive").
144. H.R. 2260.
145. Id. § 201.
146. Id. § 202.
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assisted suicide. 147 The Ashcroft Directive, discussed in Part V, would
have similarly criminalized assisted suicide and invalidated Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act by rejecting assisted suicide as a "legitimate
medical purpose."14 8 The distinctions between state and federal regula-
tion exemplify the DEA's trend in narrowing their involvement with
pain management while at the same time broadening their power over
regulating physicians beyond the physicians' own state medical boards.
Such regulation violates a patient's right to palliative care.
149
C. Criminal Prosecution
Criminal prosecutions of physicians who distribute OxyContin and
other controlled substances illustrate how a lack of responsibility and
training may lead physicians to irresponsibly distribute and administer
Schedule II narcotics. A particularly egregious instance of physician
irresponsibility is illustrated by United States v. Moyer,150 where a phy-
sician was found guilty for tampering with a consumer product and
obtaining a controlled substance through fraud in violation of the
CSA.151 While the physician's patients were in the intensive care unit,
the physician stole morphine from intravenous units and replaced it with
a saline solution. 52 Some other examples dealing with pain treatment
have resulted in convictions where physicians conducted only a cursory
assessment of the patients' pain.' 53
IV. IMPACT ON PHYSICIANS, PATIENTS, AND OTHERS
In 2003 the DEA acknowledged and attempted to refute its critics'
position that regulation ultimately leads to a "chilling effect" on effec-
tively treating patients' pain.' 54 Four years later it is clear that the refu-
147. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 3.
148. Id.; see infra Part V.
149. See supra Part II.
150. 182 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 1999).
151. Id. at 1020.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Polito, No. 96-3022, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7308 (6th Cir. Apr.
11, 1997) (affirming a doctor's conviction for the unlawful distribution of narcotics made outside
the usual course of medical practice and without a legitimate medical purpose); Konstantin v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 93-70385, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3005 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1995)
(affirming the DEA administrator's increased sanction upon a doctor for prescribing controlled
substances without a legitimate medical purpose under the CSA, where the doctor performed brief
physicals before prescribing controlled substances to undercover agents, none of whom
complained of pain); People v. Lonergan, 267 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
conviction for prescribing Schedule III drugs in violation of California Health and Safety Codes,
where the physician prescribed the drugs to a known drug addict and two undercover agents who
were not given physical examinations).
154. See Press Release, Drug Enforcement Admin., supra note 121.
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tation has done little to reassure physicians that treating pain should be
the greater goal."' Judging by its response to comments from physi-
cians, the DEA's stance on pain relief has likely caused confusion and
contention among physicians.' 56 David Brushwood, Professor of Phar-
macy Health Care Administration at the University of Florida, agrees
that the DEA's attempts to clarify previous regulations have largely
served to confuse doctors and pharmacists across the country.' 5 7 The
"chilling effect" is controversial because of its legal, medical, moral, and
ethical implications. Fear of federal regulation goes beyond physicians
and affects the patients as well, further limiting the ability of patients to
obtain adequate treatment. Sandra Johnson agrees that there is a barrier
to the effective treatment of pain, adding that other "obstacles . . .
include financial restrictions, educational deficiencies, cultural chal-
lenges, and legal and regulatory concerns." '158
A. Impact on Physicians: A Catch-22
Physicians who overprescribe risk investigation, license revocation,
sanctions, jail time, and a shattered reputation in the medical commu-
nity.'59 Physicians who underprescribe, and as a consequence do not act
155. See Brody, supra note 6 ("[Dlespite some physicians' commitment to treat pain ...
abundant evidence suggests that patients' fears of undertreatment of distressing symptoms are
justified." (internal quotations omitted)).
156. See Clarification of Existing Requirements Under the Controlled Substances Act for
Prescribing Schedule II Controlled Substances, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,408 (Drug Enforcement Admin.
Aug. 26, 2005) (notice).
157. David B. Brushwood, Same Day Multiple Prescriptions: Clarifying the Bungled DEA
Message, PAIN & L., Mar. 14, 2005, http://www.painandthelaw.org/newsbrushwood_031405.php.
158. Johnson, supra note 88, at 743.
159. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Doctors, Patients, Latest Drug War Casualties, FOXNEws.coM,
Sept. 23, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,133204,00.html. The well-publicized case
against a Harvard-trained California physician, Dr. Frank Fisher, demonstrates this point. Fisher
was mercilessly targeted for five years in, as one juror sitting for his trial described a "witch hunt."
Prosecutors brought a variety of charges, including fifteen counts of murder that were
immediately thrown out by the judge. Four years later, the judge also disposed of the felony
charges of manslaughter and fraud. The jury acquitted Fisher of all remaining misdemeanor
charges. As a result of five years of prosecution and persecution, Fisher was left with a shattered
reputation, living with his parents and facing threats of license revocation.
Fisher's personal take on the DEA crackdown on physicians describes the new wave of
prosecutions: "Law enforcement consistently seeks out rural solo practitioners to prosecute for
suspected prescribing violations and the charges leveled are becoming increasingly exaggerated.
In the past few years there have been a rash of murder and manslaughter charges leveled against
well meaning physicians around the country and several doctors have been sent to prison." Frank
Fisher, Dr. Fisher's Story: The Anatomy of an Oxycontin Bust, http://www.drfisher.org/the-story.
asp?group=2 (last visited Mar. 14, 2007). For a review of the aftermath of Fisher's devastating
tale, as well as an account of the pharmacists who were prosecuted for distributing Fisher's
prescriptions for painkillers, see Sam Stanton, Murder Case Dissolved, but So Did Doctor's Life,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 23, 2004, available at http://www.sacbee.comlcontent/news/story/
9399329p- 10323635c.html.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
in the patient's best interest, risk facing a malpractice lawsuit. 161 With
the increasing numbers of both DEA raids and investigations on one
hand and malpractice lawsuits on the other, physicians are placed in a
difficult position. The result of the chilling effect based on physicians'
fear of prosecution or DEA sanctions has also led to increasingly cau-
tious measures that are costly and unnecessary.1 6' This fear of regula-
tion physicians experience has been repeatedly acknowledged in
literature. 162
Physician malpractice suits have become standard and highly
politicized talking points in the media. Recent cases have broken
ground by awarding verdicts based on undertreatment of pain. 63  In
Bergman v. Chin the family of the decedent sued the attending physician
under California's Elder Abuse law."6 Prior to the trial on April 30,
2001, Beverly Bergman, the decedent's daughter and one of the plain-
tiffs in the case, addressed the Mayday Scholars Press Conference and
gave an emotional account of the background of this case. 165 The group
Compassion in Dying and Kathryn Tucker helped the family find legal
recourse for the pain that Mr. Bergman went through from age of eighty-
five until his death.1 66 The family filed suit for malpractice, elder abuse,
and unlawful business practices. 67 Although the family's medical mal-
practice claim was dismissed, Dr. Chin was found liable for elder abuse
160. See, e.g., Jury Decides Undertreatment of Pain Was Elder Abuse, Sets $1.5 Million
Damages, 10 HEALTH L. REP. 982 (2001) [hereinafter Jury Decides] (discussing Bergman v. Chin,
No. H205732-1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2001), http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb
(select "Case Summary" hyperlink; submit case number "CH205732")).
161. See Brody, supra note 6 ('The growing number of arrests of pain management specialists
is exacting high costs for patients, physicians and medical insurers. Some doctors order costly but
unnecessary diagnostic tests so they can show the D.E.A. a reason for prescribing strong pain
medication.").
162. See Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 1. Legal and medical scholars use the term
"opiophobia" to describe the chilling effect. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and
Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHics 28 (2001) ("Physicians have long
been accused of poor pain management for their patients. The term 'opiophobia' has been coined
to describe this remarkable clinical aversion to the proper use of opioids to control pain."); Ben A.
Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 519, 524-25
(2005) ("Because of what the DEA considers to be the high potential for abuse of drugs placed in
Schedule II, there is a widespread belief among physicians that their prescribing practices with
regard to them are carefully monitored. This perceived regulatory scrutiny, in combination with
the myths and misinformation about the risks of opioids, has caused, or at least significantly
contributed to, a phenomenon known as 'opiophobia.' "); Barth L. Wilsey, Scott M. Fishman &
Christine Ogden, Prescription Opioid Abuse in the Emergency Department, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHics 770, 779 (2005).
163. See Jury Decides, supra note 160.
164. See id.
165. Transcript of Beverly Bergman from the Mayday Scholars Press Conference, PAIN & L.,
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and recklessness.' 68 The family received a verdict of $1.5 million
because the physician administered inadequate pain management. 69
The verdict was subsequently reduced by the trial judge, who applied
California's $250,000 medical malpractice damage cap. 170 Interestingly,
even though the medical malpractice claim was dismissed, and despite
the verdict reduction under the medical malpractice cap, the case was
later "characterized as one for elder abuse rather than malpractice."'' 7 1
The court awarded the plaintiffs' attorney fees and enhanced the verdict
amount by a 1.5 multiplier "in light of the importance of the case to the
public interest."'' 72  In another California case the next year, a similar
elder abuse claim based on inadequate pain management was brought
against the decedent's attending physician and nursing home.173 Sandra
Johnson notes that these cases illustrate the problems faced by physi-
cians in treating terminally ill patients who are in a large amount of
pain. 174
Despite the risk of tort liability, physicians continue to fear federal
regulatory sanctions and often act in accordance with this fear, refusing
to prescribe or administer opioids to terminally ill patients who suffer
from chronic pain.' 75 Statements like the Ashcroft Directive, although
recently struck down by the Supreme Court, 176 heighten physicians'
fears of "causing" a patient's death.' 7 7 Physician intimidation will only
168. Jury Decides, supra note 160. Lawyers in the case focused on proving "reckless
negligence." See Eric Warm & David E. Weissman, Fast Fact and Concept #63: The Legal
Liability of Undertreatment of Pain, END OF LIFE/PALLIATIVE EDUCATION RESOURCE CTR., Mar.
2002, http://www.eperc.mcw.edu/fastFact/ff_63.htm ("By a 9 to 3 vote the jury decided that the
physicians lack of attention to pain constituted elder abuse, awarding the family $1.5 million (the
amount was reduced to $250,000). To win, lawyers convinced the jury that under-treatment of
pain was 'reckless negligence."').
169. Id.
170. Undermedicating Cases: Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Alameda County Ct., June
13, 2001), PAIN & L. [hereinafter Undermedicating Cases], http://www.painandthelaw.org/
malpractice/undermedicatingcases.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2007); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.2(b) (West 2006).
171. Undermedicating Cases, supra note 170.
172. Id.
173. Kathryn L. Tucker, Medico-legal Case Report and Commentary: Inadequate Pain
Management in the Context of Terminal Cancer: The Case of Lester Tomlinson, 5 PAIN MED. 214,
215 (2004) (discussing the case of Tomlinson v. Bayberry Care Center); see Parties Settle Elder
Abuse Lawsuit over Refusal of Pain Medication, 12 HEALTH L. REP. 1310 (2003).
174. Johnson, supra note 88, at 748-50 (discussing Bergman and Tomlinson).
175. See Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing a case where, after consulting with
ethicists and palliative care specialists, the medical staff members "remained unsettled about
whether they might have been legally liable for 'causing' [the] death"); see also Johnson, supra
note 88, at 753 ("Physicians' fear of regulatory scrutiny and intervention on the part of the state
bureau of narcotics, the state medical licensure board, and the federal Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) is a substantial barrier to access to effective pain relief for patients.").
176. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006); infra Part V.
177. See Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 1.
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increase as the DEA increases its regulation of prescriptions. Using a
three-patient illustration, Dr. Quill notes this very real intimidation, as
well as its unfortunate consequence: a decline in quality pain manage-
ment for patients suffering from intractable pain. 78 While many states
have legislation that, to varying degrees, criminalizes assisted suicide,
most of these statutes contain companion provisions that emphasize the
state's interest in palliative care and serve to distinguish assisted suicide
from aggressive pain management. 7 9 Additional state regulations, such
as MCPPs, can often serve as a nuisance and even a hindrance to effec-
tively treating patients' pain.' 80 In her address at the Mayday Scholars
Press Conference, Beverly Bergman noted that the defendant physi-
cian's excuse for not writing a prescription sooner was because "he
didn't have his triplicate pad."' 8' The deterrent effects of mandatory
triplicate programs have been heavily criticized.'
8 1
The CSA's purpose is to curb drug abuse and addiction. 83 DEA
regulation of physicians' distribution of Schedule II narcotics, therefore,
creates the inference that drugs such as OxyContin are typically used by
drug addicts rather than by patients to relieve chronic, intractable pain.
This inference increases the reluctance on the part of physicians to pre-
scribe opioids, which in turn prevents more patients from receiving
proper treatment. In Part II of this Note, there is a list of several states,
including Tennessee and Hawaii, that essentially acknowledge physician
reluctance to prescribe opioids and provide an alternative: patient refer-
rals to other specialists who do prescribe opioids.184 However, at least
one author expresses skepticism at this alternative, noting that such spe-
cialists are not typically covered by insurance policies and may not even
be accessible to pain patients. 8 5
B. Impact on Patients: Sensationalism Breeds Fear
Beth Packman Weinman attributes patients' fear at least in part to
178. See id. at 2-3.
179. See, e.g., § 782.08, FLA. STAT. (2006) ("Every person deliberately assisting another in the
commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree ......
§ 765.102, FLA. STAT. (2006).
180. See Weinman, supra note 34, at 532.
181. Transcript of Beverly Bergman from the Mayday Scholars Press Conference, supra note
165; see Weinman, supra note 34, at 532 ("Triplicate pr.:scription programs require prescribing
physicians to complete, official, government-provided, detailed prescription forms that contain
three copies.").
182. See, e.g., Weinman, supra note 34, at 532-36.
183. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 801(2) (West 2006) ("The illegal importation, manufacture,
distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and
detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.").
184. See supra Part II.
185. Weinman, supra note 34, at 511.
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cultural attitudes toward pain relief, such as a Christian-based belief sys-
tem which rewards physical suffering and the Western notion that "pain
builds character." '186 But not all patient fear is so psychosocial in nature,
as insurance coverage may also be a practical deterrent from pain
patients seeking relief,'87 and perhaps the most pervasive deterrent for
patients is the federal regulation of prescription practices. 188 Patients
who suffer chronic pain experience a twofold fear: their pain will go
undertreated, and they will become addicted if they take narcotic drugs
for pain.' 8 9
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: GONZALES V. OREGON 1 90
On April 17, 2002, the District Court of Oregon permanently
enjoined' 9' the so-called "Ashcroft Directive," 192 which construed the
CSA.' 93 The Ashcroft Directive expressly stated that physician-assisted
suicide was not a "legitimate medical purpose" under the CSA, 19 4 an
interpretation that directly conflicted with Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act ("ODWDA"). 195 Enacted by ballot measure in 1994, ODWDA
sought to "protect vulnerable patients and ensure that their decisions are
reasoned and voluntary" by allowing attending physicians of terminally
ill patients to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances. 196 Had it
been enforced, the Ashcroft Directive would have effectively preempted
the ODWDA by enforcing its construction of the CSA, "regardless of
whether state law authorizes or permits such conduct by
practitioners."' 97
In Ashcroft v. Oregon The Ninth Circuit framed the issue as
"whether Congress authorized the Attorney General to determine that
physician assisted suicide violates the CSA."'198 While the court ulti-
mately held that "It]he Ashcroft Directive violates the 'clear statement'
rule, contradicts the plain language of the CSA, and contravenes the
186. Id. at 518-19 (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 519-21 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 520.
189. See Quill & Meier, supra note 1.
190. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
191. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002), affid, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th
Cir. 2004), afftd, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
192. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Dep't of
Justice Nov. 9, 2001) (interpretive rule).
193. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-904 (West 2006).
194. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,607.
195. See OR. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 127.800-897 (West 2006).
196. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1122.
197. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,607.
198. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1123.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
express intent of Congress, '"199 the opinion contains a lot of language
focusing on federalism. Quoting a Ninth Circuit case to support his fed-
eralism argument, Judge Tallman wrote: "The principle that state gov-
ernments bear the primary responsibility for evaluating physician
assisted suicide follows from our concept of federalism, which requires
that state lawmakers, not the federal government, are 'the primary regu-
lators of professional [medical] conduct.'"20 Additionally, he cites a
1925 Supreme Court decision for the principle that "'direct control of
medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal govern-
ment."' 2o' Judge Tallman uses federalism to bolster the notion that it is
imperative to ascertain congressional intent before assuming that a fed-
eral actor has the authority to preempt state law.2 °2 The opinion also
contains references to the Supreme Court's right-to-die cases that sup-
port Oregon's right to enact ODWDA without federal government
interference.2 °3
After the Ninth Circuit's 2004 decision in Oregon v. Ashcroft, com-
mentators eagerly awaited the outcome of this "right-to-die" case in the
Supreme Court. Before certiorari was granted, one author suggested that
the Ninth Circuit might be overturned.2°4 Proponents of the "right to
life" movement viewed the case as an "opportunity for the high court to
address the right to life, 20 5 while proponents of "death with dignity"
feared not only the end to physician-assisted suicide but also the afore-
mentioned "chilling effect" on effective palliative care. 0 6 One com-
mentator expressed the concern that "[s]hould the court rule against
Oregon, the D.E.A. could turn to all physicians whose patients die while
getting prescribed opioids or barbiturates, even if the drugs were admin-
istered only to relieve intractable pain, not to hasten death. '20 7 Dr. Quill
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1124 (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002)) (additional
citation omitted).
201. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925))
(additional citation omitted).
202. See id. at 1124-25.
203. See id. at 1123-24 ("We begin with instructions from the Supreme Court that the 'earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide'
belongs among state lawmakers.") (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 701, 735 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); id at 1126 ("Physician assisted suicide is an unrelated, general
medical practice to be regulated by state lawmakers in the first instance.") (citing Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 735 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
204. Marya Lucas, Government Looks to Undo Death with Dignity Act, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 18,
2005 ("[T]he justices have a history of taking up controversial decisions out of the Ninth Circuit
and overturning them.").
205. Warren Richey, High Court Takes up Physician-Assisted Suicide, 97 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR 3-3 (2005).
206. See supra Part IV.
207. Brody, supra note 6.
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similarly warned, "[j]ust beneath the surface, however, lies the risk of
empowering agents of the [DEA] - whose traditional role is to prevent
drug abuse and diversion - to evaluate the end-of-life practices of physi-
cians whose patients die while receiving prescribed opioids or
barbiturates . 2 08
The expectations of an explosive decision were not realized when
the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Oregon in early 2006.209
Although the case was a relief to "death with dignity" proponents
because it affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, it was decided on tech-
nical administrative law grounds rather than on a moral, political, or
federalism basis. Justice Kennedy's opinion quickly sweeps aside the
"political and moral" aspects of the case and immediately hones in on
"interpreting a federal statute to determine whether Executive action is
authorized by, or otherwise consistent with, the enactment. 12 °0  The
opinion is void of politically or morally charged rhetoric and instead
opts for a basic administrative law analysis: how much deference the
Ashcroft Directive deserves and whether it had congressional authoriza-
tion.2'I The opinion relies on the Court's prior decisions in Chevron,2t 2
Auer,2 13 Mead,2 14 and Skidmore,1 5 to hold that the Ashcroft Directive
was not entitled to Chevron deference because Congress did not delegate
the authority to the Attorney General to criminalize the issuance of con-
trolled substances for physician-assisted suicide.21 6 Instead, the Ash-
croft Directive warranted only persuasive Skidmore deference, under
208. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 1.
209. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
210. Id. at 911.
211. Id. at 914 ("The parties before us are in sharp disagreement both as to the degree of
deference we must accord the Interpretive Rule's substantive conclusions and whether the Rule is
authorized by the statutory text at all.").
212. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(formulating the following two-pronged analysis for determining the amount of deference that a
reviewing court should afford to an agency's construction of the statute it administers: first,
whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue; and second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
on the issue, whether the agency or executive interpretation is a reasonable one).
213. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997) ("A rule requiring the Secretary to construe
his own regulations narrowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as
broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.").
214. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) (adding a "step zero" to the
Chevron test: before determining whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue at hand, a
court should determine whether Congress has delegated the assumed authority to the agency, and
if so, whether the agency has acted in accordance with that authority).
215. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (suggesting a rule of judicial
deference to agency action based on the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
216. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 918.
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which it did not pass muster.21 7
Despite sidestepping federalism issues, the opinion contains lan-
guage that does suggest approval of a physician's right to administer
effective palliative care. The Court rebuts the Government's argument
that the Attorney General was within his authority by saying,
[iut is not enough that the terms "public interest," "public health and
safety," and "Federal law" are used in the part of [the CSA] over
which the Attorney General has authority. The statutory terms "pub-
lic interest" and "public health" do not call on the Attorney General,
or any other Executive official, to make an independent assessment of
the meaning of federal law.218
This statement expresses a "hands off' mentality, allowing the states to
make their own decisions about the public interest of their own citizens
unless a congressional act expressly delegates such authority to an exec-
utive official. The Court emphasizes this approach by noting that the
CSA "conveys unwillingness to cede medical judgments to an Executive
official who lacks medical expertise. '219 The last sentence of the opin-
ion also expresses the state's right perspective: "The text and structure
of the CSA show that Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to
alter the federal-state balance .... ,,20 Regarding palliative care in par-
ticular, the Court highlights the Ashcroft Directive's own "distinctions
between assisting suicide and giving sufficient medication to alleviate
pain.
Perhaps the most useful analysis in establishing a right to palliative
care arises in the Supreme Court's analysis of the CSA. The Court cites
its previous decision in United States v. Moore for the proposition that
"we have not considered the extent to which the CSA regulates medical
practice beyond prohibiting a doctor from acting as a drug 'pusher'
instead of a physician. 2 22 The Court concludes that the CSA is a "stat-
ute combating recreational drug abuse, 223 rather than regulating every
possible usage of the drugs which are regulated by the statute.
Although the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the federalism issue was
technically left unresolved by the Supreme Court, the reasoning behind
Judge Tallman's discussion is sound. He relies on Linder v. United
States, which clearly states that the regulation of medicine belongs in the
217. Id. at 922.
218. Id. at 919 (emphasis supplied).
219. Id. at 921.
220. Id. at 925.
221. Id. at 921 (citing Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607 (Dep't of Justice Nov. 9, 2001) (interpretive rule)).
222. Id. at 922 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 143 (1975)).
223. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 924.
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hands of state lawmakers, not federal agencies like the DEA.224 How-
ever, this delineation is not always so easy to define, as the CSA regu-
lates both illegal and legal drugs. To remove any regulation of
prescription drugs from the DEA's control would require a restructuring
of federal law, one that would not likely be desirable for federal or state
lawmakers. The CSA itself, however, is not the problem; rather, it is the
DEA's broad interpretation of its own statutory authority that creates
cases like Gonzales, where the federal government undermines princi-
ples of federalism by usurping the states' regulation of physicians. Stay-
ing within the bounds of the CSA is necessary to prevent the federal
government from intruding on state lawmakers' functions and, ulti-
mately, states' rights.
It is hard to say what the fallout from Gonzales will be. One author
writes, "[m]ost commentators characterized [Gonzales] . . . as a narrow
administrative law ruling ... telling us little about whether other states
should follow suit or Congress should make a federal rule." ' 5 Although
language in the opinion may be supportive of right-to-die advocates, it
leaves room for Congress to enact a statute that would allow preemption
of ODWDA or even a state's palliative care law. Right-to-life propo-
nents latch onto this hope, saying that "the Court merely said the
Administration had incorrectly interpreted the [CSA], and made clear
that if Congress chooses, it has the constitutional authority to act to bar
the use of federally controlled drugs to assist suicide. 22 6 The effect of
the decision on physicians' administration of palliative care is still
unclear. To be sure, Gonzales did very little to alleviate the fears of
death-with-dignity advocates.
VI. SOLUTIONS TO PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT FEAR AND
CONFUSION ABOUT PAIN RELIEF
Proponents of aggressive pain management would agree that Gon-
zales v. Oregon was a blessing to their cause in that it refused to allow
the executive branch to overstep its bounds. However, these same pro-
ponents would likely contend that the case had little impact on remedy-
ing the ignorance and fear of the executive's regulation of prescription
practices. This Part discusses various methods - some already initiated,
others only suggested in scholarly articles - of ensuring that the pain
management crisis in the United States is recognized, addressed, and
224. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
225. Susan M. Wolf, Court Ruling Doesn't Answer Assisted Suicide Questions, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PR.ss, Jan. 29, 2006, at I lB.
226. Burke J. Balch, Supreme Court Allows Use of Federally Controlled Drugs to Assist
Suicide, 33 NAT'L RIGHT To LiF NEws (2006), available at http://www.nrlc.org/news/2006/
NRL02/HTML/AssistedSuicideBackCover.html.
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actively rectified. By implementing such solutions, American institu-
tions ranging from Congress and the federal judiciary to state legisla-
tures and universities can force our culture to confront the frequently
downplayed issues associated with end-of-life care.
A. Physicians: Education, Training, and Documentation
Dr. Quill recognizes that, although lack of education is not the pri-
mary factor, physicians' lack of awareness and proper training with
regard to prescribing opioids contributes, in some part, to the undertreat-
ment of pain.227 If physicians are educated by palliative care experts,
they will be assured that their fears of hastening death or initiating an
addiction are unfounded as long as they follow various protocol and cau-
228tionary measures. Continuing education is especially important con-
sidering the lack of pain management education that physicians receive
in their schooling. One study found that not only did none of the New
York schools surveyed have a formal pain management curriculum, but
the amount of time spent educating students about pain assessment was
"usually under 20 hours. 229 In addition to the lack of education and
training in treating pain, it is imperative for physicians to be educated
and trained in diagnosing pain. A physician's fear of regulation is based
partly on a lack of trust that the patient is truly in pain and not just an
addict disguised as a pain patient.23 ° One author agrees that lack of trust
is a barrier to effective palliative care, referencing calls that urge "doc-
tors and nurses [to] 'trust the patient's report of pain.' "231
An obvious solution to the lack of initial pain management educa-
tion that physicians receive is for medical schools to refocus their atten-
tion, to some degree, on pain management and the actual effects of
opioids. Another solution is to require physicians to devote some of
their post-scholastic time to remain up-to-date on developments in pain
management and palliative care. Finally, by enacting strict standards
under elder abuse statutes, states such as California open the door for
patients' surviving family members to sue physicians for undertreating
227. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 1.
228. See id. at 2 ("Ethics and palliative care consultants were called in, and they refocused the
[medical] team on the professional obligation to relieve pain and suffering."); supra Part IV
(discussing the impact of federal regulation on physicians).
229. Weinman, supra note 34, at 517 (citation omitted).
230. See Johnson, supra note 88, at 746 (citing a study speculating that physicians'
assumptions about a patient determine whether they will diagnose him as one in severe pain or
rather one who is seeking drugs); id. at 747 (distinguishing between an ethical physician who uses
"red flags" to identify a possible addict who falsifies his symptoms and a "hypervigilant"
physician who denies the patient access to pain relief based on prejudices and profiling).
231. Id.; see id. (asserting that "physician distrust of patients is a core issue in the effective
treatment of patients in pain").
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their relative's pain.232 The Bergman and Tomlinson cases, discussed in
Part III, exemplify the effectiveness of such statutes.233 Even though
they are less direct than medical board sanctions, such elder abuse laws
are likely to deter physicians from withholding pain treatment.
Although the risk of addiction and recreational use of opioids is
real (which is why they are classified as a Schedule II narcotic), the
benefits they provide in relieving intractable pain cannot be overstated.
Thus, while it is certainly important for physicians to be educated about
the adverse effects of the drugs they administer, medical schools and
licensing boards need to encourage and require a certain amount of
training and exposure to the benefits of opioids. To refrain from such
training is to jeopardize a terminally ill patient's right to palliative care.
B. Congress: Legislation
The Project on Legal Constraints on Access to Effective Pain Relief
has produced a Model Pain Relief Act that aims at protecting healthcare
providers and, as a result, allows patients to receive the best possible
pain treatment.234 This Act prohibits disciplinary action "against a
health care provider for the prescription, dispensing, or administration of
medical treatment for the therapeutic purpose of relieving intractable
pain," subject to compliance with guidelines and standards of prac-
tice.235 The Model Act makes a clear distinction between discipline of
the physicians who prescribe drugs lawfully under established guide-
lines, and those who fail to conduct proper checks before prescribing or
who purposely provide drugs for the patients' or the physician's per-
sonal use.23 6
In June 2001, the Senate introduced the Conquering Pain Act.23 7
Among the Act's findings was that "despite the best intentions of physi-
cians, nurses, pharmacists, and other health care professionals, pain is
often under-treated because of the inadequate training of clinicians in
pain management. ' 238 The bill included a definition of palliative care
and gave examples of how it could best be administered.2 39 The bill,
had it been passed, would have encouraged educating and protecting
232. See Johnson, supra note 88, at 748.
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. Project on Legal Constraints on Access to Effective Pain Relief, The Pain Relief Act, 24
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 317-18 (1996), available at http://www.painandthelaw.org/aslmecontent/24-
4c/painact.pdf; see Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Action and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain
Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319 (1996).
235. Conquering Pain Act of 2001, S. 1024, 107th Cong. (2001).
236. Id. § 3(1).
237. Id. §§ 3-4.
238. Id. § 2(6).
239. Id. § 3(7).
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physicians and thrust pain management and palliative care issues to the
forefront.2 4 ° The proposed bill addressed physician training,24' patient
and community support,24 2 and even insurance issues regarding the cov-
erage of palliative care.24 3
C. Executive Branch: Clarification
Part IV briefly discussed the confusion that arose when the DEA
revoked the FAQ it had previously supported.2 4 Pharmacist and Profes-
sor David Brushwood's commentary on the DEA's revocation of the
FAQ two months after it was issued paints a mystifying picture. His
editorial concludes that the DEA's notion that "multiple prescriptions on
the same day with instructions to fill on different dates is tantamount to
writing a prescription authorizing refills of a [S]chedule II substance' '245
was "obviously a preposterous position." 246 Brushwood also questions
the DEA's motives in rescinding its document, issued only two months
earlier, because it only propounded a couple of "misstatements" of the
law as its reason for revocation,247 and the ideas expressed in the FAQ
had already been articulated prior to its issuance.248 If the problem of
confusion is as prevalent as Professor Brushwood's article and the
DEA's own acknowledgement of "confusion" 24 9 indicate, then the exec-
utive branch must act. Instead, the DEA has let time pass while physi-
cians, pharmacists, and healthcare practitioners scratch their heads trying
to figure out a way to treat patients under a regulatory regime that sends
mixed messages. While more regulation to clarify current regulation
can sometimes have the backfiring effect of more federal interference,
the DEA needs to step up its efforts to "clarify" beyond the ineffective
documents that have already been released.
D. States: Medical Board Correction
Commentators agree that under the current federal regulatory sys-
240. Id. § 101 (requiring a Web site for quick reference by healthcare practitioners as well as
patients and caregivers and providing "alternative means" of such guideline information in rural
areas with limited access to the Internet).
241. Id. § 502.
242. Id. § 102.
243. Id. § 302.
244. See supra Part IV.
245. Clarification of Existing Requirements Under the Controlled Substances Act for
Prescribing Schedule II Controlled Substances, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,408 (Drug Enforcement Admin.
Aug. 26, 2005) (notice).
246. Brushwood, supra note 157.
247. Id.; see Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, supra note 127.
248. Brushwood, supra note 157.
249. See Clarification of Existing Requirements Under the Controlled Substances Act for
Prescribing Schedule II Controlled Substances, 70 Fed. Reg. 50,408.
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tern, state legislatures and medical boards have taken commendable
strides to "lessen[ ] the adverse effects of regulatory constraints on
symptom management. 25 ° Model pain statutes are one such initiative.
These statutes serve to protect law-abiding physicians who properly fol-
low established guidelines from investigation.25' MCPPs have largely
been abolished. Many states recognize the importance of palliative
care, 2 5 2 and some states allow a malpractice claim to be brought against
a physician for undertreating pain, such as in the Bergman and Tomlin-
son cases.253 Even though states are going in the right direction in
improving pain management for their citizens, there is room for more
rigorous and explicit statutory regimes. If state legislatures explicitly
recognize a fundamental right to palliative care, this could have a dimin-
ishing effect on interference by the executive branch. More importantly,
it would support a decision by the Supreme Court, in its next inevitable
case relating to end-of-life issues, to recognize the fundamental right to
palliative care implicit in its prior cases.
Unlike the DEA, medical boards have made an effort to bring uni-
formity to the otherwise enigmatic realm of treating pain using con-
trolled substances. The Federation of State Medical Boards of the
United States, Inc., adopted the Model Guidelines for the Use of Con-
trolled Substances for the Treatment of Pain in May 1998.254 The guide-
lines aim at quelling physicians' fear of disciplinary action both on the
state and federal level.255 Despite the steps toward clarity and uniform-
ity, the Model Guidelines only briefly discuss physicians' compliance
with federal law, referring physicians to the Physicians Manual of the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and applicable state documents
"for specific rules governing controlled substances. 256 These guide-
lines, and successors, could be vastly improved if they further clarified
both allowed and prohibited practices. Ann Martino addresses the con-
flict between IPTAs and state medical board rules, regulations, and
guidelines, which stems from the fact that most of the IPTAs provide
protection to physicians while state medical boards merely impose new
250. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at 1; see Johnson, supra note 88, at 754.
251. Quill & Meier, supra note 1, at I.
252. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 192.350 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-A:15(I-a)(b)
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:9U-5(d)(2) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(1)
(McKinney 2007); see also supra Part II (discussing these cited statutes).
253. See Johnson, supra note 88, at 748.
254. MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
PAIN (Fed'n of State Med. Bds. of the United States, Inc. 1998), available at http://www.medsch.
wisc.edu/painpolicy/domestic/model.htm.
255. Id. § I.
256. Id. § 11(7).
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sets of requirements on physicians." 7 These, and similar guidelines,
were initially praised, but Martino cautions that studies and anecdotal
evidence suggest that guidelines and regulations - even those with the
best of intentions - have not quelled physician fear of regulatory reper-
cussions and have consequently done little to improve adequate treat-
ment of pain. 8
Keeping in mind the strides that state medical boards have made, as
well as the goals that they aim to accomplish, further initiatives could
include taking disciplinary action against a physician who is accused of
administering inadequate pain treatment.2 59 Martino's article provides
models of a formal rule that would make underprescribing a ground for
punishment.2 60  The models range from direct and aggressive26  to
cautious.262
E. Patients: Education and Awareness
"While the idea of establishing a policy against under-prescribing
makes good sense, guidelines or rules alone are not going to change
behavior. Board members and licensees have to change the way they
think about prescribing to chronic pain patients. Eventually, the patients
too will have to be more aware. 2 63
Education is an important tool in dispelling the nationwide frenzy
in reaction to the prescription of opioids. Thus, it is important that the
general public's fear of addiction is quelled by actual facts about pain
management. The media's increased sensationalizing of drug abuse
scandals only serves to discourage patients from taking such medication,
even if their physicians think it would be in the patients' best interest to
take a controlled substance, such as OxyContin, to reduce pain. If the
treating physician does her part by discussing the medication's effects
and by working with the patient to taper off of the drug when necessary,
rather than just leaving the patient in the dark, the patient's fears will at
least be diminished if not dispelled.
257. Martino, supra note 26, at 332.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 333.
260. Id. at 343-44.
261. "Failure to adequately prescribe, order, administer, or dispense controlled substances,
including opioid analgesics, for the relief or modulation of chronic pain in accordance with
accepted knowledge and prevailing clinical practice for pain treatment and the standard for
chronic pain management established in [IPTA or rule]." Id. at 343.
262. "Nothing in this subrule shall be construed to be an advocation of the imprudent or
improper use of opioid analgesics. Further, this subrule shall not relieve a licensee of the
obligation to comply with state and federal laws governing the lawful prescribing, ordering,
administering, or dispensing of controlled substances." Id. at 344 (citation omitted).
263. Id. (citation omitted).
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As mentioned earlier, the notion that pain is a test of endurance and
will permeates Western culture. Until this cultural attitude changes, it is
likely that at least some patients who are suffering treatable pain will not
receive relief. Changing a culture takes time, effort, and patience, but
there is hope of doing so.
CONCLUSION
There is no shortage of anecdotal and statistical evidence that the
DEA is increasingly targeting physicians as a means to eradicate sub-
stance abuse. Although investigations are warranted in some cases,
some physicians can lose their entire reputation and career based on an
unjust accusation. 64 The culture of fear among physicians ultimately
leads patients to experience unbearable pain at the end of their lives, and
fear may ultimately result in a lawsuit for elder abuse against the non-
prescribing physician.265 Scholars and public interest groups like the
American Pain Society can only do so much to establish a concrete right
to palliative care. All three branches of federal government, as well as
state governments, need to take the next step toward establishing a right
to palliative care in order to protect citizens from living their last days in
unbearable pain.
This Note acknowledges the legitimate problem of prescribing
addictive narcotics to patients who use the drugs recreationally. How-
ever, the equally legitimate goal to provide pain relief to terminally ill
patients should not fall to the wayside of regulating overprescription. A
patient who is in the advanced stages of terminal cancer is left with a
predictable fate. Depriving this patient of adequate pain relief seems not
only unjust, but cruel and dehumanizing. When this picture of looming
death and intractable pain is painted against a background of fear and of
government regulation, however, it morphs into a disturbing portrait: the
War on Drugs extends beyond illegal drug trafficking to diminution of
legitimate pain relief. Without stepping back to view the picture as a
whole, our nation fixates on ending drug abuse and addiction, losing
sight of its interest in providing relief to people who are suffering
extreme pain.
264. Dr. Frank Fisher's story is an unfortunate example of such a "witch hunt." See discussion
supra note 159.
265. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
